missouri v jenkins case brief 1990

Here, the KCMSD may be ordered to levy taxes despite the statutory limitations on its authority in order to compel the discharge of an obligation imposed on KCMSD by the Fourteenth Amendment. Local government bodies in Missouri, as elsewhere, must derive their power from a sovereign, and that sovereign is the State of Missouri. App. Footnote 6 With him on the briefs were William Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, James B. Deutsch, Deputy Attorney General, Michael J. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 491 U. S. 295. U.S. 209 No. U.S. 33, 57] 423 [495 Stat. [495 to Pet. The District Court concluded that it would be "clearly inequitable" to require the population of KCMSD to pay half of the desegregation cost, and that "even with Court help it would be very difficult for the KCMSD to fund more than 25% of the costs of the entire remedial plan." 137.073.2 (1986). Footnote 14 Although a court cannot, post hoc, amend an order to make it appear that it took an action which it never took, the Court of Appeals actually amended its order to reflect the reality of the action taken on October 14, at which time it had entered an order denying the "petitions for rehearing en banc" because this was the manner in which the papers filed with the court had been styled. address. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. v. JENKINS ET AL. 35, 28 U.S.C. In this situation, there could be no authority for a judicial order touching on taxation. Can a court create a segregation remedial plan which has a goal of attracting nonminority students into the district? County of Macon has little relevance to the present case, for KCMSD's obligation to fund the desegregation remedy arises from its operation of a segregated school system in violation of the Constitution, not from a contract between KCMSD and respondents. If the Eighth Circuit had regarded the State's 46(c) (which provides the courts of appeals with authority to sit in banc) speak of rehearing in banc, not en banc. (c) The modifications are not invalid under the Tenth Amendment, since that Amendment's reservation of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a federal court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment. 1983, the District Court found that the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) and petitioner State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. In calculating the hourly rates for Benson's, his associates', and the LDF attorneys' fees, the District Court took account of delay in payment by using current market rates, rather than those applicable at the time the services were rendered. 88-1150 Decided by Rehnquist Court Lower court United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Citation 495 US 33 (1990) Argued Oct 30, 1989 Decided Apr 18, 1990 Footnote 20 The Court's discussion today, and its stated approval of the "method for future funding" found "preferable" by the Court of Appeals, is unnecessary for the decision in this case. III, U.S. Const. In fact, the taxation power is sought here on behalf of a remedial order unlike any before seen. (1906); Credit Co. v. Arkansas Central R. Co., Thank you and the best of luck to you on your LSAT exam. 469 U.S. 248 You can opt out at any time by clicking the unsubscribe link in our newsletter, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action (BAMN). Jackson County also filed a "Petition . [495 Second, the decree must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it must be designed as nearly as possible to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct. State laws, including taxation provisions legitimate and constitutional in themselves, define the power of the KCMSD. This holding has no application to this case, for the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal courts from imposing on the States the costs of securing prospective compliance with a desegregation order, Milliken v. Bradley, ] Chief Judge Lay dissented from the resolution of the property tax issue. . He argued that as the State and KCMSD were jointly and severally liable for the cost of the desegregation remedy, the District Court should have allowed any amount that KCMSD was unable to pay to fall on the State rather than require the tax increase. It cannot be contended that interdistrict comparability, which was the ultimate goal of the District Court's orders, is itself a constitutional command. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, did not hold that a district court could never set aside state laws preventing local governments from raising funds sufficient to satisfy their constitutional obligations just because those funds could also be obtained from the States. 491 U.S. at 285. Both Benson and the LDF employed numerous paralegals, law clerks, and recent law graduates, and the court awarded fees for their work based on market rates, again using current, rather than historic rates, in order to compensate for the delay in payment. ] KCMSD voters approved a levy of $3.75 per $100 in 1969, but efforts to raise the tax rate higher than that had consistently failed to obtain the approval of two-thirds of the voters, and the District Court found it unlikely that a proposal to raise taxes above $3.75 per $100 would receive the voters' approval. 411 Justice Souter dissented in this case and argued that the majoritys holding limiting the district courts remedial authority was contrary to the precedent established in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! U.S. 33, 60] A legislative vote taken under judicial compulsion blurs lines of accountability by making it appear that a decision was reached by elected representatives when the reality is otherwise. The District Court therefore abused its discretion in imposing the tax itself. U.S. 358, 368 operates to suspend the finality of the . The remedy must therefore be related to the condition alleged to offend the Constitution. 215 The remedy must therefore be related to the condition alleged to offend the Constitution. ] This practice is now reflected in this Court's Rule 13.4: "[I]f a petition for rehearing is timely filed in the lower court by any party in the case, the time for filing the petition for a writ of certiorari . Missouri v. Jenkins | Oyez - {{meta.fullTitle}} denied, (1879) (where the statute empowering the corporation to issue bonds contains a limit on the taxing power, federal court has no power of mandamus to compel a levy in excess of that power; "We have no power by mandamus to compel a municipal corporation to levy a tax which the law does not authorize. "Proposition C" allocates one cent of every dollar raised by the state sales tax to a schools trust fund and requires school districts to reduce property taxes by an amount equal to 50% of the previous year's sales tax receipts in the district. App. U.S. Supreme CourtMissouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990), In an action under 42 U.S.C. 495 U. S. 45-50. [495 With respect to the would-be intervenors, the Court of Appeals upheld the denial of intervention. [ On remand, however, the District Court held that the State and KCMSD were 75% and 25% at fault, respectively, ordered them to share the cost of the remedy in that proportion, and held them jointly and severally liable. JENKINS 495 U.S. 33 (1990) Jenkins produced a unanimous result but with two sharply differing opinions on an important question concerning the power of federal courts to remedy school desegregation. Some essential litigation history is necessary for a full understanding of what is at stake here and what will be wrought if the implications of all the Court's statements are followed to the full extent. [495 -721 (1883). The majority would limit these authorities to a narrow "exceptio[n]" , 1983, on which respondents' complaint is based, is authority enough to require each tortfeasor to pay its share of the cost of the remedy if it can, and apportionment of the cost is part of the equitable power of the District Court. And the important effects of the taxation order discussed here raise additional federalism concerns that counsel against the Court's analysis. The court ordered the state to fund salary increases for teachers and staff within the school district and to fund remedial magnet programs for so long as student achievement scores stayed at or below national averages. With all respect, it is this third group of cases that applies. U.S. 688 The Kansas City Desegregation Case. Sch. 78, p. 523 (J. Cooke ed. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. [ officials from applying state law that would interfere with the willing levy of property taxes by KCMSD," ante, at 56, n. 20, cause the KCMSD to exercise power under state law. Davis v. Michigan Dept. In so doing the Court emphasized that the District Court had "neither attempted to restructure local governmental entities nor to mandate a particular method or structure of state or local financing." Rather, that term must refer to a reasonable fee for an attorney's work product, and thus must take into account the work not only of attorneys, but also the work of paralegals and the like. (1979); Dayton Bd. H. Bartow Farr . U.S. 1 (1977), the District Court found this insufficient. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. 107 Rather, it affirmed "the actions that the court has taken to this point." U.S. 1, 5 . Respondents insist that the Eighth Circuit routinely withholds the mandate during the pendency of a suggestion for rehearing in banc even without the order contemplated by Rule 41(a) and point us to United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1299 (1987), where the Chief Judge of that court wrote separately respecting the denial of rehearing in banc to emphasize that the Eighth Circuit has done so. The State's argument that federal courts cannot set aside state-imposed limitations on local taxing authority because that requires local governments to do more than exercise the power that is theirs has been rejected, Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. By then it was clear that KCMSD would lack the resources to pay for its 25% share of the desegregation cost. We stated that the District Court could "require the Supervisors to exercise the [495 An adjustment for delay in payment is an appropriate factor in determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee under. Pp. Missouri v. Jenkins 495 U.S. 33 (1990) | Encyclopedia.com We said that such a remedy "could be construed as the direct imposition of a state tax, a remedy beyond the power of a federal court." Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II) | Case Brief for Law Students That Amendment has no application to an award of attorney's fees, ancillary to a grant of prospective relief, against a State, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, and it follows that the same is true for the calculation of the amount of the fee. ] The Court of Appeals also relied on Circuit precedent suggesting that a district court could order a property tax increase after exploring every other fiscal alternative. 291 (1987). We have long since determined that "unequal expenditures between children who happen to reside in different districts" do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. These common-law mandamus decisions do not purport to involve the Federal Constitution or remedial powers. (1909); Graham v. Folsom, [ In November 1986, the District Court endorsed a marked expansion of the magnet school program. Jenkins Case Brief Case Name: Missouri v. Jenkins Case Citation: 491 U.S. 274 (1989) FACTS: Plaintiff sues Defendants claiming racial segregation. (1964)), the court ordered the KCMSD property tax levy raised from $2.05 to $4.00 per $100 of assessed valuation through the 1991-1992 fiscal year. It is accepted by all the parties, as it was by the courts below, that the imposition of a tax increase by a federal court was an extraordinary event. As the State puts it, "[t]he only reason that the court below needed to consider an unprecedented tax increase was the equally unprecedented cost of its remedial programs." 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 The following criteria must be considered in evaluating a request for attorneys' fees in a common fund.. Dowd v. City of L.A., Case No. The District Court's January 3, 1989, order does not support, but refutes, the Court's characterization. 9 "The judiciary . ] The District Court also found that none of the alleged discriminatory actions had resulted in lingering interdistrict effects and so dismissed the suburban school districts and denied interdistrict relief. Some commentators agree, stating that Jenkins II brought an end to court-ordered desegregation of schools through reliance on a narrow, case-specific point without a discussion of the precedent from which it seemed to depart. "The Fourteenth Amendment . The case raises two im-portant issues: constitutional federalism concerns of the sort dealt with in the Court's opinion, and broader questions about the prac- Casebriefs is concerned with your security, please complete the following, The Bank of the United States: A Case Study, Are We a Nation? United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1372-1373 (1975) (District Court may "implement its desegregation order by directing that provision be made for the levying of taxes"); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1320, cert. Decided April 18, 1990. [ Under Freeman v. Pitts, three factors inform a courts discretion on continuing a decree to remediate school discrimination: (i) whether compliance exists with those parts of the decree where federal intervention is to be withdrawn; (ii) whether judicial control is necessary to achieve compliance with other parts of the school system; and (iii) whether the district has shown a good-faith adherence to the decree. Pp. The Court of Appeals observed that the increases were designed to eliminate the vestiges of state-imposed segregation by improving the "desegregative attractiveness" of the district and by reversing "white flight" to the suburbs. In this 18-year-old school desegregation litigation, see, e. g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33, Missouri challenges the District Court's orders . Decided. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285, 109 S.Ct. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) - supreme.justia.com We granted certiorari, 488 U.S. 888 (1988), to resolve two questions relating to fees litigation under 90 Stat. We have emphasized that although the "remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task, .
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